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Abstract. We prove existence and puriﬁcation results for equilibria in which
players choose extreme points of their feasible actions in a class of strategic en-
vironments exhibiting a product structure. We assume ﬁnite-dimensional action
sets and allow for inﬁnite-dimensional externalities. Applied to large games, we
obtain existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies while allowing a contin-
uum of groups and general dependence of payoﬀs on average actions across groups,
without resorting to saturated measure spaces. Applied to games of incomplete
information, we obtain a new puriﬁcation result for Bayes-Nash equilibria that
permits substantial correlation across types, without assuming conditional inde-
pendence given the realization of a ﬁnite environmental state. We highlight our
results in examples of industrial organization, auctions, and voting.
1. Introduction
We study a general class of strategic environments exhibiting a product structure
and prove existence of equilibrium in an abstract setting; adding an assumption of
nonatomicity, we further show that every equilibrium can be puriﬁed in the sense
that there exists an equivalent equilibrium in which players choose extreme points of
their feasible actions. When the product structure is imposed on the set of players in
a large game, we identify a player with the group she belongs to and a nonatomically
distributed personal characteristic, and we assume payoﬀs depend on own actions
and the proﬁle of average actions of the groups. The space of groups is general, we
allow for inﬁnite-dimensional externalities across groups, and we obtain existence
of Nash equilibria in which players choose from the extreme sets of their actions.
Ours is the ﬁrst such result that does not make use of saturated measure spaces;
the cost is that action sets are ﬁnite-dimensional. When the product structure is
imposed on type spaces in a Bayesian game, we view a player’s type as consisting of
a general component together with an atomless, conditionally independent, private
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values component. The general component is allowed to be correlated among players,
and we obtain a puriﬁcation result for games with ﬁnitely many actions, the ﬁrst
such result that allows for substantially correlated information, without assuming
conditional independence given the realization of a ﬁnite environmental state.
Examples: Consider a market composed of a large number of ﬁrms, where each
ﬁrm is characterized by its location t and technological characteristic u. Assume
that there are inﬁnitely many locations and inﬁnitely many technologies. Each ﬁrm
(t,u) produces a vector q(t,u) ∈ Rd of commodities belonging to a production set
Y (t,u). Let α(t) = ∫uq(t,u)du denote the aggregate production vector at location
t, averaging over ﬁrm technologies u. We assume implicitly that prices are deter-
mined by product and factor market clearing in each location, where consumers
and workers may (at some cost) travel to transact in markets at diﬀerent locations.
Thus, prices and ﬁrm proﬁts depend on the aggregate production function α. For
simplicity, we write the proﬁt of ﬁrm (t,u) from production vector q(t,u) given
aggregate production α as π(t,u,q(t,u);α). Assume types and locations lie in com-
plete, separable metric spaces; production sets Y (t,u) are nonempty, compact, and
lower measurable; proﬁts are jointly measurable and continuous in (q(t,u),α); and
that ﬁrm types u are nonatomically distributed. Our result for large games (Propo-
sition 1) ensures that a Nash equilibrium exists. The innovation with respect to the
literature (see, for instance, Yu and Zhu (2005)) is in allowing for the information
of inﬁnitely many locations to aﬀect the price received by a given ﬁrm.
Next, consider a multi-unit auction for bonds, drilling rights, etc. Assume that
there are n bidders, indexed by j. Each bidder j performs a private investigation to
determine the value of diﬀerent portfolios, summarized by a multidimensional signal
tj, and submits a menu of bids as a function of holdings, with prices determined
by any order statistic over bids. Although privately observed by the bidder, her
signal potentially contains information relevant to the other bidders, as bidders
may have diﬀerent signal technologies, and there may be inherent randomness in
testing; so the expected value of the objects for bidder j depends on the entire proﬁle
(t1,...,tn). Moreover, assume that bidder j has an additional private characteristic
uj that aﬀects the value of the objects for bidder j only (due, e.g., to aspects of
the bidder’s production technology or product market), and that uj is conditionally
independent given tj. Assume types belong to complete, separable metric spaces;
bids are in discrete (and bounded) monetary amounts, so there are only ﬁnitely many
feasible bids, that the distribution of signals tj satisﬁes the standard diﬀuseness
condition; and the private value types uj are nonatomically distributed. Our result
for Bayesian games (Proposition 2) ensures existence of Bayes-Nash equilibria, andEXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 3
moreover that each equilibrium in mixed strategies can be puriﬁed. While existence
of mixed strategy equilibria in this model follows from known results (see Milgrom
and Weber (1985)), the innovation with respect to the literature on puriﬁcation is
in allowing for very general correlation among the signals (t1,...,tn). The implied
existence of pure strategy equilibria extends Athey’s (2001) Theorem 1 for ﬁnite
games and McAdams’ (2006) Theorem 1 for multi-unit auctions to settings with a
private-value component: the existence of (possibly non-monotonic) pure strategy
Bayes-Nash equilibria in these settings does not require single-crossing conditions.
Finally, consider a voting game among n voters who must choose between two
alternatives, A and Q, using majority rule or other quota rule. A state variable s
is selected by nature, and conditional on s, each voter j receives a signal tj drawn
(independently conditional on s) from a countable signal space. In addition, each
voter is characterized by a preference parameter uj that is independent of the other
voters’ types. Then the payoﬀ of voter j from outcome x = A,Q, given prefer-
ence parameter uj and state s, is written Uj(x,s,uj). Assuming that states and
preference parameters belong to complete, separable metric spaces and that prefer-
ence parameters are nonatomically distributed, our result for Bayesian games yields
existence and puriﬁcation of Bayes-Nash equilibria. When the state s is discrete,
the puriﬁcation theorem of Milgrom and Weber (1985) applies, but we allow for a
continuously distributed state variable. As such, we generalize the existence result
Proposition 1 of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), who assume a one-dimensional
state and ﬁnite signal space, and we do so without imposing the monotonicity con-
ditions used to obtain equilibria in cutoﬀ strategies. In fact, our result does not use
the assumption of two alternatives, and so it extends to any number of alternatives
and voting mechanism in which voters choose messages from a ﬁnite set.
Analytical framework: Our general framework is formulated abstractly, with-
out an immediate interpretation in terms of a game; there are, for example, no
players and no payoﬀ functions. It can be viewed, rather, as a ﬁxed point theorem
that exploits a special kind of product structure on its domain. This product struc-
ture allows us to apply the iterated integral approach used by Duggan (2011b) to
prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in noisy stochastic games.
To convey the idea, we deﬁne a choice function γ as assigning to each pair (t,u) a
choice in Rd. We then calculate the corresponding average choice function, α, by
taking the marginal, α(t) = ∫uγ(t,u)du, of γ pointwise for each t. We then assign
a choice set M(t,u;α) to each pair (t,u), where by construction these sets depend
only on average choices, and we deﬁne a choice equilibrium as a mapping γ such
that for almost all (t,u), γ(t,u) belongs to the choice set M(t,u;α) determined4 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
by the corresponding average choices. Our existence result for choice equilibria
is non-nested with Theorem 2.2.1 of Balder (2002), who establishes existence of
equilibria in pseudogames that are more general than our model in that his action
sets may be inﬁnite-dimensional, but less general in that he assumes externalities
are ﬁnite-dimensional. Beyond existence, assuming u is nonatomically distributed,
we provide a puriﬁcation result: for every choice equilibrium, there is an extremal
choice equilibrium ˆ γ that chooses from the (closure of) extreme points of choice sets
M(t,u; ˆ α); moreover, ˆ γ is equivalent to γ in the sense that it determines the same
average choices and, therefore, the same choice sets for all (t,u). In the general
framework, we impose further product structure on the general component t and
choice sets to obtain Bayesian environments as special cases.
The existence argument takes place in the space of average choice functions. We
deﬁne S(α) as the set of selections of the correspondence t ↦ ∫uM(t,u;α)du, and
we prove existence of a ﬁxed point α∗ ∈ S(α∗) that is generated by an equilibrium
choice function γ∗. The ﬁxed point argument surmounts a number of technical
challenges. To ensure sequential upper hemicontinuity of S, we apply results of
Yannelis (1990, 1991) on properties of selections of correspondences, and as the
space of average choice functions is not necessarily (weakly) compact or metrizable,
we apply a recent result of Agarwal and O’Regan (2002) to obtain a ﬁxed point, α∗.
Finally, we employ the theorem of Artstein (1989) to back out an equilibrium choice
function γ∗ consistent with α∗. Our puriﬁcation argument relies on an application
of a version of Lyapunov’s theorem (see Hildenbrand (1974)) pointwise for each t,
using nonatomicity of u; we then apply Arstein’s theorem again to back out an
extremal choice function. Of note, the latter step relies on a result (Lemma 10,
in the appendix) establishing lower measurability of the extreme points of a lower
measurable correspondence with nonempty, compact values in Rd.
Related literature: Our existence results for Nash equilibria in large games is
non-nested with respect to the results in Martins-da-Rocha and Topuzu (2008) and
Balder (2002), as we allow for inﬁnite-dimensional externalities at the cost of ﬁnite-
dimensional action sets. With respect to Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997), we provide a
modeling approach that allows us to handle inﬁnite-dimensional externalities with-
out relying on an inﬁnite-dimensional version of Lyapunov’s theorem. In particular,
letting σ denote a strategy proﬁle and σ(t,u) denote the action of player (t,u),
the standard approach would be to condense externalities to the ﬁnite-dimensional
statistic β = ∫(t,u)σ(t,u)d(t,u), which means that two strategy proﬁles σ and ˆ σ
with β = ˆ β are considered equivalent by all players. In contrast, in our model, it is
the inﬁnite-dimensional statistic α(⋅) = ∫uσ(⋅,u)du on which players condition theirEXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 5
choices; it is obviously possible to have α ≠ ˆ α while β = ˆ β, so players react to a richer
set of “societal statistics” in our formulation. This modeling strategy at the same
time circumvents the failure of Lyapunov’s theorem in inﬁnite dimensions, without
resorting to saturated (or super-nonatomic) measure spaces, as in Podczeck (2008).
Our existence result for pure-strategy Bayesian equilibrium is non-nested with
the application of Balder’s (2002) results to pure-strategy Bayesian equilibrium. His
Theorem 3.2.1 gives conditions for existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian equilibrium;
in comparison to our result, he allows for a measure space of players and inﬁnite-
dimensional action sets (we assume a ﬁnite set of players and ﬁnite-dimensional
action spaces), but he assumes a countable set of states of the world, convex action
sets, and concave payoﬀ functions (we allow for a general type component and as-
sume ﬁnite action sets). In comparison to the puriﬁcation results of Migrom and
Weber (1985), Khan, Rath, and Sun (2006), and Balder (2008), we generalize condi-
tional independence of types and drop ﬁniteness of their “environmental variable,”
t0. Instead, we assume a product structure on player types by decomposing player
types into a general component (which are possibly correlated and distributed very
generally) and an atomless, private value component (which is independently drawn
conditional on the proﬁle of general types). Viewing one of the players as Nature,
with trivial action space, we can easily incorporate an environmental variable t0
that lives in a general complete, separable metric space. Compared to the recent
puriﬁcation results based on saturated measure spaces (Loeb and Sun (2006), Pod-
czeck (2009), and Wang and Zhang (2010)), we obtain similar improvements: only
the private component is assumed conditionally independent, and the environmen-
tal variable need not be ﬁnite or countable. There is no need to resort to saturated
measure spaces, as we apply the classical Lyapunov result; but the cost, as before,
is the ﬁnite-dimensionality of the action space.
Organization: In Section 2, we present the abstract framework, and Section 3
contains the statement and proofs of our main existence and puriﬁcation results.
Section 4 provides an application of our general results to large games, and Section
5 takes up the case of Bayesian games. The appendix contains Lemma 10, on the
lower measurability of the extreme points of a correspondence.
2. Abstract Framework
Let (N,N, ) be a measure space, where N is a complete, separable metric space,
N the Borel sigma-algebra, and   = ( j)n
j=1 a Rn-valued, Borel vector probability
measure on N. Assume:6 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
(A1) N = T1 × ⋯ × Tn × U, where Tj, j = 1,...,n, and U are complete, separable
metric spaces.
Let Tj, j = 1,...,n, and U be the respective Borel sigma-algebras. Let T = ⨉
n
j=1Tj
and T =  
n
j=1Tj, with generic element t = (t1,...,tn) ∈ T, and note that N = T ⊗U
(see Theorem 4.44 of Aliprantis and Border (2006), henceforth AB). Let κj denote
the marginal of  j on Tj.
Assume: for each j = 1,...,n,
(A2) there is a Borel transition probability νj(⋅ ⋅)∶Tj ×U → [0,1] such that for all
Q = R ×S ∈ T ⊗U,
 j(Q) =  
Tj
νj(S tj)κj(dtj),
so that νj(⋅ tj) is a Borel probability measure on U for κj-almost all tj ∈ Tj and
tj ↦  j(E tj) is a Tj-measurable function for all E ∈ U. In particular, the mapping
tj ↦ νj(⋅ tj) is Borel measurable with the weak* topology on the space of Borel
probability measures on U (see Theorem 19.7 of AB). In terms of standard notation,
 j is the extension of νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗ κj to N. An implication is that the distribution
of u according to  j is independent of t−j. For each t ∈ T, we therefore write
 (⋅ t) = (νj(⋅ tj))n
j=1 as the vector of conditional probabilities.
For each j = 1,...,n and (tj,u) ∈ Tj ×U, let Aj(tj,u) ⊆ Rd denote a set of feasible
alternatives. A choice function for j is a Tj ×U-measurable mapping γj∶Tj ×U → Rd
such that for νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗ κj-almost all (tj,u), we have γj(tj,u) ∈ Aj(tj,u). For each
j = 1,...,n, let Uj ∈ U contain the atoms of {νj(⋅ tj) ∶ tj ∈ Tj}, and assume:
(A3) for all (tj,u) ∈ Tj × U, Aj(tj,u) is nonempty and compact; and for each
(tj,u) ∈ Tj × Uj, the set Aj(tj,u) is convex,
(A4) the correspondence Aj∶Tj × U ⇉ Rd is lower measurable, i.e., for all open
G ⊆ Rd, the set {(tj,u) ∈ Tj ×U ∶ Aj(tj,u) ∩G ≠ ∅} is Tj ⊗U-measurable.
We make use of the following:
Lemma 1: For each j = 1,...,n, the mapping (t,u) → sup  Aj(t,u)   is N-
measurable.
Proof: Note three observations: with continuity of the Euclidean norm    ⋅   ,
(A6) implies that the correspondence (t,u) ↦   Aj(t,u)   is lower measurable with
nonempty, closed values in R; as a consequence, there is a sequence {fn} of N-
measurable functions fn∶N → R such that for all (t,u),   Aj(t,u)   = cl{fn(t,u)} (see
Corollary 18.14 in AB); and the pointwise limit of a sequence of measurable functionsEXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 7
into a complete, separable metric space is itself measurable (see Lemma 4.29 of AB).
Therefore, (t,u) ↦ sup  Aj(t,u)   = sup{fn(t,u)} is N-measurable. This completes
the proof of the lemma.
Let 1 ≤ p < ∞ and 1
p + 1
q = 1 be ﬁxed for the remainder of the paper. Assume: for
each j = 1,...,n,




sup  Aj(tj,u)  
pνj(du tj) < ∞.
For later use, we record the following strengthening of assumption (A5):
(A5′) the mapping (tj,u) ↦ sup  Aj(tj,u)   is p-integrably bounded, i.e.,
 
(tj,u)
sup  Aj(tj,u)  
p(νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗κj)(d(tj,u)) < ∞.
When p = 1, assumption (A5′) (and therefore (A5)) is automatically satisﬁed if the
feasible sets are bounded by a ﬁxed, compact subset of Rd, but we allow in principle
for arbitrarily large action sets A(i). In particular, (A5) does not preclude the
possibility that action sets grow large “quickly” as we vary tj.
A choice function is an ordered n-tuple γ = (γj)n
j=1 of choice functions for j =
1,...,n. A choice function γj for j determines an average choice function for j,
denoted αj∶Tj → Rd, as follows: for each tj ∈ Tj, we deﬁne
αj(tj) =  
u
γj(tj,u)νj(du tj)(du),
which is Borel measurable by (A2). More precisely, given γj, deﬁne the Tj-measurable
function αj(⋅ γj)∶Tj → Rd by αj(tj γj) = ∫uγj(tj,u)νj(du tj). Then the set of aver-
age choice functions for j consists of any mapping that is equivalent to some αj(⋅ γj)





αj∶Tj → Rd ∶
αj(tj) = αj(tj γj) for κj-almost all tj ∈ Tj





We will sometimes suppress dependence of αj(⋅ γj) on γj without confusion in the
sequel. An average choice function is an ordered n-tuple α = (αj)n
j=1 of average
choice functions for j = 1,...,n. Note that because (A5) is stated pointwise for each
tj, it does not imply compactness of the space of average choice functions for j in
the weak topology.
Given any α ∈ A and j = 1,...,n, let Mj(⋅;α)∶Tj ×U ⇉ Rd be a choice correspon-
dence. Assume: for each α ∈ A and j = 1,...,n,8 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
(A6) for all (tj,u) ∈ Tj ×U, Mj(tj,u;α) ⊆ Aj(tj,u);
(A7) for all (tj,u) ∈ Tj ×U, the set Mj(tj,u;α) is nonempty and compact; and for
all (tj,u) ∈ Tj ×Uj, the set Mj(tj,u;α) is convex;
(A8) the correspondence (tj,u) ↦ Mj(tj,u;α) is lower measurable, i.e., for all
open G ⊆ Rd, the set {(tj,u) ∈ Tj × U ∶ Mj(tj,u;α) ∩ G ≠ ∅} is Tj ⊗ U-
measurable;
(A9) the correspondence (tj,u) ↦ Mj(tj,u;α) is uniformly bounded by a p-
integrable correspondence, i.e., there exists a lower measurable correspon-
dence Υj∶Tj × U ⇉ Rd with compact and convex values such that for all
α ∈ A and all (tj,u) ∈ Tj ×U, we have Mj(tj,u;α) ⊆ Υj(tj,u), and
 
(tj,u)
sup  Υj(tj,u)  p(νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗κj)(d(tj,u)) < ∞.
Note, in particular, that we impose convexity only on the atoms of U; if the probabil-
ity measures {νj(⋅ tj) ∶ tj ∈ Tj} are nonatomic, then (A7) demands only that choice
sets be nonempty and compact. Also note that if we strengthen (A5) to (A5′), as-
sumption (A9) is implied by our other assumptions by taking Υj(tj,u) = Aj(tj,u)
for all (tj,u) ∈ Tj × U.
We have not as yet shown the existence of average choice functions that are p-
integrable; the existence of such functions does not follow from (A5), because that
assumption does not restrict feasible action sets across tj, but it does follow from
(A6)–(A9). This is established in the next lemma. Henceforth, let A
p
j = {αj ∈ Aj ∶
  αj  p < ∞} denote the subset of p-integrable average choice functions for j.
Lemma 2: For each j = 1,...,n, A
p
j is nonempty.
Proof: Since Aj is lower measurable with closed values, it admits a measurable
selection γj (see Theorem 18.13 in AB), and then αj = αj(⋅ γj) is an average choice
function for j, and α = (αj)n
j=1 ∈ A. Then (A7) and (A8) imply that Mj(⋅;α) admits a
measurable selection ˜ γj; (A6) implies that ˜ αj = αj(⋅ ˜ γj) is an average choice function
for j; and (A9) implies   ˜ αj  p < ∞. Therefore, ˜ αj ∈ A
p











j ≡ Lp(Tj,Tj,κj), where Lp(Tj,Tj,κj) is the set of κj-equivalence classes of
Tj-measurable mappings αj∶Tj → Rd such that   αj  p ≡ ∫tj   αj(tj)  pκj(dtj) < ∞.
Convergence in L
p
j is deﬁned with reference to the dual space, L
q
j ≡ Lq(Tj,Tj,κj),
so that given any net {αν
j}, we have αν








j, and endow this space with the
product topology.EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 9
Finally, we impose the natural assumption that choice sets are (sequentially) up-
per hemicontinuous on the space of p-integrable average choice functions.1 Assume:
for each j = 1,...,n,
(A10) for all (tj,u) ∈ Tj × U, the correspondence α ↦ Mj(tj,u;α) is sequentially
upper hemicontinuous on Ap.
Thus, the degree p of integrability controls the tradeoﬀ between our boundedness
assumptions on Aj(tj,⋅) and Mj(⋅;α) (in (A5) and (A9)) and our continuity as-
sumption on Mj(tj,u;⋅) (in (A10)); of course, higher p strengthens boundedness
and weakens continuity.
3. Main Result
A choice function γ∗ is a choice equilibrium if γ∗
j (tj,u) ∈ Mj(tj,u;α∗) for νj(⋅ ⋅)⊗
κj-almost all (tj,u) and α∗
j(tj) = ∫uγ∗
j (tj,u)νj(du tj) for κj-almost all tj, and all
j = 1,...,n. An extremal choice equilibrium is a choice equilibrium γ∗ such that for
each j = 1,...,n and νj(⋅ ⋅)⊗κj-almost all (tj,u), we have γ∗
j (tj,u) ∈ extMj(tj,u;α∗),
where extMj(tj,u;α∗) is the set of extreme points of Mj(tj,u;α∗). We denote by
extMj(tj,u;α∗) the closure of the set of extreme points of the choice correspondence.
Our main theorem asserts existence of a choice equilibrium and a partial puriﬁcation
result: given any choice equilibrium, there is a choice equilibrium such that choices
are made from the closure of extreme points of choice sets for almost all (tj,u) with
u in the nonatomic part of Uj and that is equivalent the choice equilibrium, in the
sense that the equilibria determine the same average actions (and therefore same
choice sets) up to a set of measure zero.
Theorem: Assume (A1)–(A10). (a) A choice equilibrium exists; (b) for every
choice equilibrium γ∗, there exists a choice equilibrium ˆ γ such that (i) γ∗ and ˆ γ
determine equivalent average actions, i.e., for each j = 1,...,n and κj-almost all tj,
α∗
j(tj) = ˆ αj(tj); and (ii) ˆ γ chooses from the closure of extreme points of choice sets
for the nonatomic part of U, i.e., for each j = 1,...,n and νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗ κj-almost all
(tj,u) ∈ Tj ×(U ∖Uj), we have ˆ γj(tj,u) ∈ extMj(tj,u; ˆ α).
Obviously, if the probabilities {νj(⋅ tj) ∶ tj ∈ Tj} are nonatomic and the sets
of extreme points are almost always closed, then extremal choice equilibria exist,
1Given Banach space X and set Y ⊆ X, a correspondence ψ∶Y ⇉ Y is sequentially upper hemi-
continuous if for all weakly closed sets F ⊆ X, the lower inverse ψ
ℓ(F) = {x ∈ Y ∶ ψ(x) ∩ F ≠ ∅} is
sequentially closed in the weak topology relative to Y , i.e., every sequence in ψ
ℓ(F) that converges
in the relative topology on Y has limit in ψ
ℓ(F).10 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
and we can strengthen part (b) of the theorem to obtain a full puriﬁcation result.
Closedness of the set of extreme points does not hold generally (see Figure 7.4 of
AB), but it does hold widely.
Corollary: Assume that (A1)–(A10) hold; that for each j = 1,...,n, we have
Uj = ∅; and for each α ∈ A and for νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗ κj-almost all (tj,u), extMj(tj,u;α) is
closed. (a) An extremal choice equilibrium exists; (b) for every choice equilibrium,
there exists an extremal choice equilibrium ˆ γ that determines equivalent average ac-
tions, i.e., for each j = 1,...,n and κj-almost all tj, α∗
j(tj) = ˆ αj(tj).
The remainder of this section consists of the proof of the theorem, and we as-
sume throughout that conditions (A1)–(A10) hold. To begin, we deﬁne two useful
correspondences. For j = 1,...,n, let A∗
j∶Tj ⇉ Rd be deﬁned by
A∗
j(tj) =  
u
Aj(tj,u)νj(du tj),
and for each α ∈ A, deﬁne M∗
j (⋅;α)∶Tj ⇉ Rd by
M∗
j (tj;α) =  
u
Mj(tj,u)νj(du tj).
These are, respectively, the Aumann integrals of the feasible action correspondence
Aj(tj,⋅), and of the choice correspondence Mj(tj,⋅;α), with respect to u. Note that
(A6) implies that M∗
j (tj;α) ⊆ A∗
j(tj). Also, because we are only interested in almost
everywhere properties, it is without loss to assume that (Tj,Tj,κj), j = 1,...,n, is a
complete measure space. More precisely, (A5) and (A10) ensure that we will work
with integrably bounded measurable functions, so the integrals does not change
when we consider the completion of (Tj,Tj,κj), j = 1,...,n.
The next lemma characterizes the average choice functions for j in terms of
the correspondence A∗
j, and it characterizes the almost everywhere selections from
Mj(⋅;β) (for any given average choice function β) in terms of M∗
j (⋅;β).
Lemma 3: For j = 1,...,n and each Tj-measurable αj∶Tj → Rd, (a) αj is a
κj-almost everywhere selection from A∗
j if and only if αj ∈ Aj; (b) for each β ∈ A, αj
is a κj-almost everywhere selection from M∗
j (⋅;β) if and only if there exists a choice
function γj for j with γj(tj,u) ∈ Mj(tj,u;β) for νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗ κj-almost all (tj,u) such
that for κj-almost all tj, αj(tj) = ∫uγj(tj,u)νj(du tj).
Proof: To prove (a), note that the “if” direction is immediate from the deﬁnition
of average choice function for j. Indeed, letting αj ∈ Aj be determined as αj =
αj(⋅ γj) for the choice function γj for j, it follows that for all tj ∈ Tj, γj(tj,⋅)∶U →
Rd is a selection from Aj(tj,⋅)∶U ⇉ Rd, and therefore tj ↦ ∫uγj(tj,u)νj(du tj)EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 11
is a Tj-measurable selection from A∗
j. Since αj(tj) = ∫uγj(tj,u)νj(du tj) for κj-
almost all tj, this direction is proved. For the “only if” direction, let αj be a κj-
almost everywhere selection from A∗
j. Then the theorem of Artstein (1989) yields a
Tj ⊗U-measurable mapping γj∶Tj × U → Rd such that for κj-almost all tj, we have:
αj(tj) = ∫uγj(tj,u)νj(du tj), and for νj(⋅ tj)-almost all u, γj(tj,u) ∈ Aj(tj,u). In
particular, his assumptions (i)–(vi) are fulﬁlled, respectively, by (A1) (twice), the
assumption that νj(⋅ ⋅)∶U × Tj → [0,1] is a transition probability, (A3), (A4), and
(A5). Thus, αj is determined as αj = αj(⋅ γj) for the choice function γj for j. The
proof of (b) is parallel, using Mj(⋅;β) and M∗
j (⋅;β) instead of Aj and A∗
j. This
completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 4: For j = 1,...,n, (a) the correspondence A∗
j has nonempty, compact,
and convex values; (b) for each α ∈ A, the correspondence M∗
j (⋅;α) has nonempty,
compact, and convex values.
Proof: Nonemptiness in (a) follows from (A3) and (A4), which imply that Aj
is lower measurable with nonempty, closed values, and so it admits a measurable
selection (see Theorem 18.13 of AB); nonemptiness in (b) follows similarly from
(A7) and (A8). For compactness in (a) and (b), note that (A5) implies that for κj-
almost all tj, the correspondence u ↦ Aj(tj,u) is p-integrably bounded with respect
to νj(⋅ tj). By a version of Fatou’s lemma (see Proposition 7 (p.73) of Hildenbrand
(1974)), the integral A∗
j(tj) = ∫uAj(tj,u)νj(du tj) of this correspondence is compact.
Similarly, the integral M∗
j (tj) = ∫uMj(tj,u;α)νj(du tj) is compact. Now note that
for each tj ∈ Tj,
A
∗





so convexity in (a) follows because the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is convex by
a version of Lyapunov’s theorem (see Theorem 3 (p.62) of Hildenbrand (1974)), and
the second term is convex by (A3). The argument for convexity in (b) is parallel,
using (A7) instead of (A3). This completes the proof of the lemma.
The next lemma elaborates on convexity if M∗
j (tj;α). Note that because the latter
set is nested between the integral of extreme points of Mj(tj,u;α) and the integral of
the convex hull, the lemma implies equality of all three sets. A further implication,
since Mj(tj,u;α) is convex for all u ∈ Uj by (A7), is that for each j = 1,...,n, each
α ∈ A, and each tj ∈ Tj, we have M∗
j (tj;α) = ∫ucoMj(tj,u;α)νj(du tj).
Lemma 5: For each j = 1,...,n, each α ∈ A, and each tj ∈ Tj, we have
 
U∖Uj
extMj(tj,u;α)νj(du tj) =  
U∖Uj
coMj(tj,u;α)νj(du tj).12 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
Proof: Fix α ∈ A and tj ∈ Tj. It is clear that the integral of extreme points of
Mj(tj,u;α) is contained in the integral of the convex hull. For the opposite inclusion,
note that u ↦ Mj(tj,u;α) is p-integrably bounded by (A5) and (A6). Then
 
U∖Uj






where the ﬁrst equality follows from nonatomicity of νj(⋅ tj) on U ∖Uj and a version
of Lyapunov’s theorem (see Theorem 4 (p.64) of Hildenbrand (1974)),2 and the
second follows from (A7) and the observation that the convex hull of a compact set
C is equal to the convex hull of the extreme points of coC (coC = coextcoC by the
Krein-Milman theorem, Theorem 7.68 of AB), and the fact that C and its convex
hull possess the same extreme points (extcoC = extC). This completes the proof of
the lemma.
Lemma 6: For each j = 1,...,n, the set A
p
j is convex and norm-closed.
Proof: Convexity follows from Lemmas 3 and 4, which establish that A consists
of all measurable selections from the convex-valued correspondence A∗
j. To prove
norm-closedness, assume the sequence {αm




j → αj in measure (AB, Theorem 13.39), and therefore there is a subsequence
(still indexed by m) and a κj-measure zero set Rj ∈ Tj such that for all tj ∉ Rj,
αm
j (tj) → αj(tj) (AB, Theorem 13.38). Given any tj ∉ Rj, since αm
j (tj) ∈ A∗
j(tj)
for all m, and since A∗
j(tj) is compact by Lemma 4, it follows that αj(tj) ∈ A∗
j(tj).
Then Lemma 3 yields αj ∈ A
p
j. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 7: For each tj ∈ Tj, the correspondence α ↦ M∗
j (tj;α) is sequentially
upper hemicontinuous on Ap.
Proof: Fix tj ∈ Tj. Note that for each α ∈ A, we have M∗
j (tj;α) ⊆ A∗
j(tj), the
latter compact by Lemma 4. Thus, the correspondence α ↦ M∗
j (tj;α) has closed
values (by Lemma 4) and compact range, and it suﬃces to prove sequentially closed
graph on Ap. Furthermore, by Lemma 5, it suﬃces to show α ↦ ∫ucoMj(tj,u;α)
has sequentially closed graph. By Lemma 4, it has nonempty, convex, and closed
values. Furthermore, (A10) implies that for each u ∈ U, the correspondence α ↦
coMj(tj,u;α) is sequentially upper hemicontinuous on Ap (see Theorem 17.35 of
AB). Now, let {αm} be a sequence in converging to α in Ap, and let ym ∈ M∗
j (tj,αm)
2Note that Hildenbrand assumes the correspondence is bounded below; see, however, Aumann’s
(1965) discussion following his Theorem 3 to the eﬀect that integrable boundedness is suﬃcient.EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 13
for each m and ym → y. We apply Theorem 6.5 of Yannelis (1991) to conclude that
y ∈ M∗
j (tj,α). In particular, to fulﬁll the assumptions of that theorem, we iden-
tify our (U,U,νj(⋅ tj)) with Yannelis’ ﬁnite measure space (T,τ, ); Rd with his X;
our correspondence u ↦ Υj(tj,u) is his correspondence t ↦ K(t); and our corre-
spondence Mj(tj,⋅;αm) is his φn. Then limsupM∗
j (tj,αm) is contained in the clo-
sure of ∫ulimsupMj(tj,u;αm)νj(du tj). By (A10), we have limsupMj(tj,u;αm) ⊆
Mj(tj,u;α) for all u ∈ U. Since M∗
j (tj;α) is closed, by Lemma 4, we conclude
that y ∈ limsupM∗
j (tj,αm) ⊆ cl∫ulimsupMj(tj,u;αm)νj(du tj) ⊆ M∗
j (tj;α). This
completes the proof of the lemma.
Deﬁne Sj∶Ap ⇉ L
p
j so that Sj(α) consists of all Tj-measurable, κj-almost every-
where selections from M∗
j (⋅;α). The product correspondence S = ⨉
n
j=1Sj will be the
subject of our ﬁxed point argument.





j consist of all Tj ⊗ U-measurable, ν(⋅ ⋅) ⊗ κj-almost everywhere
selections from Υj. By Theorem 3.1 and Remark 3.1 of Yannelis (1991) with Rd for
his X, S∗
j is compact in L
p
j(Tj×U,Tj×U,νj(⋅ ⋅)⊗κj) endowed with the weak topology
induced by L
q








  φ(β)(tj)  pκj(dtj) ≤  
(tj,u)
  β(tj,u)  p(νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗κj)(d(t,u)) < ∞,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality and the second from (A9).
We claim that φ is continuous. Consider a net {βν} in S∗
j such that βν → β ∈ S∗
j in








[ϕ(tj)⋅(βν(tj,u) −β(tj,u))](νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗κj)(d(tj,u))
→ 0,
as claimed. Therefore, φ(S∗
j ) is a compact subset of L
p
j, and because Sj(α) ⊆ φ(S∗
j )
for all α ∈ Ap, it follows that the range Sj(Ap) is relatively compact. That is is a
subset of Ap follows from Lemma 3 and the observation that M∗
j (tj;α) ⊆ A∗
j(tj) for
all tj. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 9: For each j = 1,...,n, Sj has nonempty, closed, convex values and is
sequentially upper hemicontinuous.14 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
Proof: For nonemptiness, consider any α ∈ Ap, and note that (A7) and (A10) im-
ply that Mj(⋅;α) admits a measurable selection γj (see Theorem 18.13 of AB). Deﬁn-
ing the average choice function βj for j by βj(tj) = ∫uγj(tj,u)νj(du tj), Lemma 3
implies βj ∈ Sj(α). To prove that Sj(α) is weakly closed in L
p
j, note that M∗
j (⋅;α) has
nonempty, compact, and convex values by Lemma 4, and it is p-integrably bounded
by (A9). Then the result follows from Theorem 3.1 and Remark 3.1 of Yannelis
(1991). Convexity follows from Lemma 4. To show sequential upper hemicontinuity,
note that Sj has compact range by Lemma 8, so we must show sequentially closed
graph. Let {αm} be a sequence converging to α in Ap, and let βm ∈ Sj(αm) for
each m and βm → β. We apply Theorem 5.5 of Yannelis (1991) to conclude that
β ∈ Sj(α). In particular, to fulﬁll the assumptions of that theorem, we equip the set
P = {α} ∪ {αm} with the metric ρ deﬁned as follows: for each m, let ρ(α,αm) = 1
m,
and for ℓ ≠ m, let ρ(αℓ,αm) =  1
ℓ − 1
m ; then the sequence {αm} trivially converges to
α in the metric topology on P; our (Tj,Tj,κj) is Yannelis’ complete, ﬁnite separable
measure space (T,τ, ); Rd is his X; our correspondence tj ↦ ∫uΥj(tj,u)νj(du tj)
is his correspondence t ↦ K(t); and our correspondence (tj,α) ↦ M∗
j (tj;α) is his
(t,p) ↦ ψ(t,p). Note that the latter correspondence has nonempty, closed, convex
values by Lemma 4, and it is sequentially upper hemicontinuous in α from Lemma
7. (Inspection of the proof of Yannelis’ Theorem 5.5 reveals that sequential upper
hemicontinuity is all that is required.) Because α and the sequence {αm} are ar-
bitrary, sequential upper hemicontinuity follows. This completes the proof of the
lemma.





the product norm, making it a Banach space. We observe that the correspondence
S∶Ap ⇉ Lp satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 2.3 of Agarwal and O’Regan (2002).
In particular, Lemma 6 implies that Ap is a nonempty, convex, norm-closed subset
of Lp; Lemma 9 implies that S(α) is nonempty, weakly closed, and convex for
each α ∈ Ap, and that the correspondence is sequentially upper hemicontinuous;
furthermore, Lemma 8 implies that the range of S is a relatively compact subset
of Ap with the weak topology. Then there exists α∗ ∈ Ap satisfying α∗ ∈ S(α∗).
Since α∗
j is a selection from M∗
j (⋅;α∗) for each j = 1,...,n, Lemma 3 yields choice
functions γ∗
j for each j such that α∗ is determined by γ∗ = (γ∗
j )n
j=1, and therefore γ∗
is a choice equilibrium.
For part (b), let γ∗ be a choice equilibrium with corresponding average choice





extMj(tj,u;α∗) if u ∉ Uj
Mj(tj,u;α∗) else.EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 15
By (A7) and Lemma 10 (in the appendix), it follows that extMj(⋅;α∗) is lower
measurable with nonempty, compact values. As the measurable splicing of two such
correspondences, ˆ Mj is lower measurable with nonempty, compact values. Since














and therefore for κj-almost all tj, we have α∗
j(tj) ∈ ∫u ˆ Mj(tj,u)νj(du tj). The cor-
respondence ˆ Mj satisﬁes the conditions of Artstein’s (1989) theorem, and therefore
there exists a Tj ⊗ U-measurable mapping ˆ γj∶Tj × U → Rd such that for κj-almost
all tj, we have: α∗
j(tj) = ∫u ˆ γj(tj,u)νj(du tj) = αj(⋅ ˆ γj), and for νj(⋅ tj)-almost all u,
ˆ γj(tj,u) ∈ ˆ Mj(tj,u). Then ˆ γ = (ˆ γj)n
j=1 is an extremal choice equilibrium as called
for by the theorem.
4. Large Games
The goal of this section is to formulate a class of large games as a special case of
the abstract framework. We endow the set N of players with a product structure,
so that a player is described by a general component t and a private characteristic
u, where the latter are distributed independently conditional on t in the space of
players. The abstract framework from Section 2 specialized to n = 1 is readily seen
as a large game framework. Given a measure space (T,T ,κ), let M(T,T ,κ,Rd)
denote the set of κ-equivalence classes of measurable functions mapping T to Rd. A
product large game is described by a tuple (T,U,A,P,κ,ν) such that
  N = T ×U, with sigma-algebra T ⊗U is the player space,
  A∶N ⇉ Rd is the feasible action correspondence,
  P∶N × Rd ×M(T,T ,κ,Rd) ⇉ Rd is the preference correspondence,
  κ is a Borel probability measure on T,
  ν∶T ×U → [0,1] is a Borel transition probability.
Here, κ is the distribution of general components t in the player space; the transition
probability ν(⋅ t) gives the distribution of private characteristic u conditional on t;
and   = ν(⋅ ⋅) ⊗ κ gives the overall distribution of players in the game. Denote a
generic player by i = (t,u) ∈ N.16 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
Given the above, the player space is succinctly described by (N,N, ) with N =
T × U and N = T ⊗U, as in the abstract framework. Assumption (A2), with n = 1,
is already embedded in the deﬁnition of a product large game. Letting U contain
the atoms of {ν(⋅ t) ∶ t ∈ T}, we make the following basic assumption to connect the
large game model to Section 2:
(L1) assumptions (A1), (A3), (A4) and (A5′) from Section 2 hold with n = 1,
A strategy proﬁle is an N-measurable mapping σ∶N → Rd such that σ(i) ∈ A(i)
for  -almost all players i. Given a strategy proﬁle σ, the implied average action is
a function α∶T → Rd satisfying α(t) = ∫uσ(t,u)ν(du t) for κ-almost all t (where we
identify functions equivalent up to sets of measure zero). Let A denote the space
of average actions. A possible interpretation is that players are characterized by
their private characteristics, u, and by the groups to which they belong, t, and the
externality (or “societal responses”) are captured by the average actions α across
groups; thus, the inﬂuence of “society” on a player’s outcome, given a strategy σ,
is captured by the inﬁnite dimensional object α. Returning to the example of the
intro, it may be that players are ﬁrms, that t is the market in which a ﬁrm competes,
and u is a technological characteristic of the ﬁrm.
We interpret the set P(i,a;α) as the set of actions that are strictly preferred to
a by player i given externality α.3 Let R∶N ×Rd ×M(T,T ,κ,Rd) ⇉ Rd denote the
weak preference correspondence corresponding to P, i.e., R(i,a;α) = {a′ ∈ Rd ∶ a ∉
P(i,a′;α)}, and let R−1 denote its inverse. Fix player i and externality α. We say
P(i,⋅;α) is irreﬂexive if for all a ∈ Rd, we have a ∉ P(i,a;α). Following Duggan
(2011a), we say that a set Y ⊂ A(i) is ﬁnitely dominant if it is ﬁnite and for all
x ∈ A(i) there exists y ∈ Y with y ∈ P(i,x;α). Given v ∈ A(i), we say that P(i,⋅;α)
is ﬁnitely subordinated to v if there is a ﬁnitely dominant set Y with v ∈ Y and such
that there exists z ∈ Y with v ∈ P(i,z;α) and Y  {v} ⊆ R−1(t,u,z;α). We say that
P(i,⋅;α) satisﬁes the ﬁnite-subordination property if there is no v ∈ A(i) such that
P(i,⋅;α) is ﬁnitely subordinated to v. We make the following further assumptions:
(L2) for all i ∈ N and all α ∈ A, P(i,⋅;α) is irreﬂexive and satisﬁes the ﬁnite-
subordination property,
(L3) for all i ∈ T ×U, all a ∈ A(i), and all α× A, R(i,a;α) ∩ A(i) is convex,
3We remark that the formulation of the preference correspondence P is not subject to the
critique in Balder (2000) (see Martins-da-Rocha and Topuzu (2008)). We note also that Martins-
da-Rocha and Topuzu (2008) provide general suﬃcient conditions on P that yield well-behaved
choice correspondences M. We simply oﬀer a set of such suﬃcient conditions, without attempting
to generalize other approaches in the literature.EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 17
(L4) for all α ∈ A, the correspondence i ↦ {a ∈ A(i)∶P(i,a;α) = ∅} is lower
measurable,
(L5) for all i ∈ N, the set {(a,α) ∈ A(i)×A ∶ P(i,a;α) ≠ ∅} is open in the product
topology, where A is endowed with the weak topology (consistent with p
from (L1)).
For all i ∈ N and all α ∈ A, let M(i;α) = {a ∈ A(t,u) ∶ P(t,u,a;α) ∩ A(i) = ∅}
denote the maximal feasible actions for player i given externality α. A strategy
proﬁle σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium if σ∗(i) ∈ M(i;α∗) for  -almost all i and α∗(t) =
∫uσ∗(t,u)ν(du t) for κ-almost all t. This is readily seen as the specialization of a
choice equilibrium from Section 2 for the case n = 1. Assume that (L1)–(L5) hold.
Then we have:
Proposition 1: Assume (L1)–(L5). (a) A Nash equilibrium exists; (b) for ev-
ery Nash equilibrium σ∗, there exists a Nash equilibrium ˆ σ such that (i) σ∗ and ˆ σ
determine equivalent externalities, i.e., for κ-almost all t, α∗(t) = ˆ α(t); and (ii) ˆ σ
chooses from the closure of extreme points of choice sets for the nonatomic part of
U, i.e., for  -almost all i ∈ T × (U ∖U), we have ˆ σ(i) ∈ extM(i; ˆ α).
The result follows from the correspondence between product large games and the
abstract framework, with n = 1, upon verifying (A1)–(A10). We have noted (A2),
and remaining assumptions (A1)–(A5′) follow directly from (L1), with (A5′) giving
us (A9) as well. The deﬁnition of M(i;α) immediately yields (A6). Nonemptiness
of M(i;α) follows from compactness of A(i) (from (L1)), (L2), (L5), and Theorem 1
of Duggan (2011a); and compactness of M(i;α) follows immediately from the open
graph assumption (L5). Given i ∈ T×U, irreﬂexivity (from (L2)) and convexity (from
(L3)) of P(i,⋅;α) yield convexity of M(i;α). Indeed, suppose suppose M(i;α) is not
convex, so there exist distinct x,y ∈ M(i;α) and λ ∈ (0,1) such that z = λx+(1−λ)y ∉
M(i;α). Then there exists w ∈ A(i) such that w ∈ P(i,z;α). Since x ∈ M(i;α), we
have x ∈ R(i,w;α), and similarly y ∈ R(i,w;α). But then convexity of R(i,w;α)
implies z ∈ R(i,w;α), a contradiction. We conclude that (A7) holds. Then (L4)
implies (A8), and (L5) implies (A10) by standard continuity arguments.
Proposition 1 generalizes Theorem 2 and Remark 2 in Schmeidler (1973) from
the model with a ﬁnite number of groups to the general model with a continuum
of groups. More importantly, the assumption that best responses depend on the
distribution across groups of average actions within groups, rather than the overall
average action, puts Proposition 1 in an intermediate position compared to other
results in the literature. The externality α is an inﬁnite-dimensional object, as op-
posed to the ﬁnite-dimensional externalities found in the literature, either the overall18 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
average action as in Rath (1992), or the ﬁnite-dimensional image of a function of the
overall average action, as in Balder (2002), Martins-da-Rocha and Topuzu (2008),
and Yu and Zhu (2005).4 So we allow for players to respond to a much richer set of
“societal” variables, weakening considerably the implied notion of anonymity. Be-
cause we restrict the analysis to ﬁnite-dimensional action sets, whereas the literature
allows for arbitrary compact action sets, our result is intermediate.
Proposition 1 occupies a non-existent position in Table 1 of Khan, Rath, and Sun
(1997): the rightmost column of that table indicates that in games with uncountable
action spaces and inﬁnite-dimensional externalities, there is no pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. Here, we do have an uncountable action space and inﬁnite-dimensional
average actions α, the product structure of the player-type space, together with the
result of Artstein (1989), allow us to work around the failure of Lyapunov’s theorem
in inﬁnite dimensions, without having to move into Loeb or super nonatomic measure
spaces (see, among others, Podczeck (2008)).
For completeness, we consider the case that preferences are represented by a
numerical payoﬀ function π∶N × Rd × M(T,T ,κ,Rd) → R. As before, we simply
oﬀer a (standard) set of suﬃcient conditions, without attempting to generalize other
approaches in the literature (see Balder (2002) and Martins-da-Rocha and Topuzu
(2008)). Maintaining (L1), assume that for all i ∈ N, π(i,⋅,⋅) is jointly continuous
on A(i) × M(T,Rd); and that for all i ∈ T × U, A(i) is convex and, moreover, for
all α ∈ M(T,T ,κ,Rd), π(i,⋅,α) is quasiconcave on A(i). Also assume that for each
(a,α) ∈ Rd × M(T,Rd), the mapping i ↦ π(i,a,α) is N-measurable. We imbed
this in the product large game framework in the obvious way, deﬁning P(i,a;α) =
{a′ ∈ A(i) ∶ π(i,a′;α) > π(i,a;α)}, so that best responses are the payoﬀ-maximizing
feasible actions:
M(i;α) = {a ∈ A(i) ∶ P(i,a;α) = ∅} = arg max
a′∈A(i)
π(i,a′;α).
Then conditions (L2)–(L5) obtain. Indeed, irreﬂexivity of P(i,⋅;α) follows by con-
struction, and the ﬁnite subordination property is implied by the fact that P(i,⋅;α)
is a weak order of the set of feasible actions; thus, (L2) follows. Quasiconcavity
of π on A(i) for all i ∈ T × U implies (L3). From the assumption that the payoﬀ
function π(⋅,⋅;α) is Carath´ eodory for each α, and from the assumption that i ↦ A(i)
is lower measurable, a measurable version of the maximum theorem (AB Theorem
18.19) implies that the correspondence M(⋅;α)∶N ⇉ Rd is measurable. Thus, it is
4More precisely, the former two papers allow for inﬁnite-dimensional externalities on the purely
atomic part of the player space, while the externality on the non atomic part must be ﬁnite-
dimensional. With nonatomicity, externalities do not have any inﬁnite-dimensional component.EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 19
lower measurable (AB, Lemma 18.2), and (L4) follows. Finally, (L5) follows from
continuity of π(i,⋅;⋅) for each i ∈ N.
5. Bayesian Games
We now present a general class of Bayesian games that can be obtained as a special
case of the abstract framework of Section 2. The type of a player j has two compo-
nents, tj and uj, the ﬁrst a general component that may be payoﬀ relevant for all
players, the second a private value component that, conditional on tj, is independent
of the other players’ types. We allow the action sets to be type dependent. Formally,
the class of product Bayesian games is described by a tuple (Tj,Uj,Aj,πj,κ,νj)n
j=1
indexed by the set {1,...,n} of players and such that for each player j = 1,...,n,
  Tj × Uj, with sigma-algebra Tj ⊗Uj, is j’s type space,
  Aj∶Tj ×Uj ⇉ Rd is j’s feasible action correspondence,
  πj∶Rnd × T × Uj → R is j’s payoﬀ function,
  κ is a Borel probability measure on T = ⨉
n
j=1Tj,
  νj ∶ Tj ×Uj → [0,1] is a Borel transition probability,
where T = ⨉
n
j=1Tj is the set of proﬁles of general types, denoted t = (t1,...,tn),
and κ is j’s prior probability measure on T = ⨉
n
j=1Tj. As usual, T =  
n
j=1Tj and
U =  
n
j=1Uj are the product sigma-algebras. We deﬁne the transition probability
ν∶T ⊗ U → [0,1] as follows: for each t ∈ T and each S = S1 × ⋯ × Sn ∈ U, ν(S t) =
 
n
j=1νj(Sj tj). Let κj denote the marginal of κ on Tj.
We let   = ν(⋅ ⋅)⊗κ represent the common prior of the players and  j the marginal
of   on Tj ×Uj. Note that, conditional on tj, the random variable uj is independent
of (t−j,u−j). Assume: for each j = 1,...,n,
(B1) Tj and Uj, j = 1,...,n, are complete, separable metric spaces with their
Borel sigma-algebras,
(B2) for all (tj,uj) ∈ Tj×Uj, the feasible set Aj(tj,uj) is a face of the unit simplex
in Rd,
(B3) the correspondence Aj∶Tj × Uj ⇉ Rd is lower measurable,
(B4) πj(a,t,uj) is Borel measurable in (a,t,uj) and multilinear in a = (aj)n
j=1,





 πj(a,t,uj) κ(dt) < ∞,20 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
where ∆ is the unit simplex in Rd. An interpretation, suggested by (B2) and (B4),
is that an action aj is a probability distribution over a ﬁnite set of pure strategies
corresponding to the vertices of the unit simplex in Rd. Here, we allow for Aj(tj,uj)
to be a lower-dimensional face of the unit simplex (we assume only that the number
of feasible actions is bounded above by d across players and types), in which case
pure strategies corresponding to vertices outside Aj(tj,uj) are necessarily given
probability zero.
Finally, we impose the assumption of absolutely continuous information, intro-
duced by Milgrom and Weber (1985), on the general type component.
(B6) κ is absolutely continuous with respect to  
n
j=1κj.
For each j = 1,...,n, a strategy for player j is a Tj ⊗ Uj-measurable function
σj∶Tj × Uj → Rd such that σj(tj,uj) ∈ Aj(tj,uj) for κj-almost all (tj,uj). We view
a strategy proﬁle (σ1,...,σn) as a mapping σ∶T × U → Rnd deﬁned by σ(t,u) =
(σj(tj,uj))n
j=1. Let Σj denote the set of strategies for j and Σ = ⨉
n
j=1Σj the set of
strategy proﬁles. Player j’s ex ante expected payoﬀ from a proﬁle σ of strategies is
Πj(σ) =  
(t,u)
πj(σ(t,u),t,uj) (d(t,u)).
A Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle σ∗ such that for each j = 1,...,n,
Πj(σ∗) = supσj∈Σj Πj(σj,σ∗
−j). We say σ∗ is a pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium
if it is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium such that for each j = 1,...,n and for  j-almost all
(tj,uj), we have σ∗
j (tj,uj) ∈ extAj(tj,uj).
Our main contribution in this section is an existence and puriﬁcation result for
pure strategy equilibria. To deﬁne our notion of equivalence between strategy pro-
ﬁles, note that for each j = 1,...,n, the expected action of player j determined by
strategy σj, conditional on general component tj, is
αj(tj σj) ≡  
uj
σj(tj,uj)νj(duj tj),
where αj(⋅ σj) ∈ L1
j by (B2). Let Aj = {αj(⋅ σj) ∶ σj ∈ Σj} denote the space of
expected actions for player j, and endow it with the weak topology σ(L1
j,L∞
j ). By
Fubini’s theorem and multilinearity, from (B4), we have



















πj(σj(tj,uj),α−j(t−j σ−j),t,uj)νj(duj tj)κ(dt),EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 21
where α−j(t−j σ−j) = (αk(tk σk))k≠j. Because the expected payoﬀ depends on σ−j
only through expected actions, we can redeﬁne the ex ante payoﬀ function for player
j as the mapping Πj∶Σj × A−j → R given by




where A−j = ⨉k≠j Ak is endowed with the product topology. Accordingly, we replace
the optimization of Πj(σj,σ∗
−j) with Πj(σj,α−j(⋅ σ∗
−j)) in the deﬁnition of Bayes-
Nash equilibrium. We then say two strategy proﬁles σ,σ′ are equivalent if they
determine the same expected actions, i.e., for each j = 1,...,n and for κj-almost all
tj, we have αj(tj σ) = αj(tj σ′).
Proposition 2: Assume (B1)–(B6). (a) A Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists; (b)
if the probability measures {νj(⋅ tj) ∶ tj ∈ Tj} are nonatomic for each j = 1,...,n,
then for every Bayes-Nash equilibrium σ∗, there exists an equivalent pure strategy
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Before proceeding to the proof, several remarks are in order.
Remark 1: We can add a complete, separable metric space T0 of environmental
states at no cost. For this, we simply add an artiﬁcial player 0, whose general
type component t0 corresponds to the environmental state, with trivial action set
A(t0,u0) ≡ {0} for all (t0,u0).
Remark 2: The puriﬁcation result in Proposition 2(b) is, to the best of our
knowledge, the ﬁrst that allows for a general space of environmental states. From
Remark 1, we generalize the puriﬁcation result of Milgrom and Weber (1985) by
allowing for an uncountable set of states. Typical results in the literature (e.g.,
Milgrom and Weber (1985), Khan, Rath, and Sun (2006), and Balder (2008)) assume
the existence of an environmental variable t0, taking at most countably many values
and such that player types are independent conditional on t0. Such a result is easily
obtained as a corollary of Proposition 3(b) by trivializing Tj, using the private type
component uj to represent the information of player j, and letting T0 be countable.
Remark 3: We also extend the previous literature on puriﬁcation by allowing
a non-private values type component that is correlated across players. There is no
need to assume the general type spaces Tj of the players j ≠ 0 are singletons, as in
the last remark; rather, we allow Tj to be a complete, separable metric space, and
we permit arbitrary correlation subject only to the diﬀuseness condition (B6).
Remark 4: Proposition 2 provides an existence result for mixed strategy Bayes-
Nash equilibria in the framework of Milgrom and Weber (1985). As mentioned,22 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
we can add a Polish space T0 of states to our framework at no cost. In contrast
to Milgrom and Weber (1985), we assume types have a conditionally independent,
private-value component uj, in addition to the standard component; action sets are
ﬁnite-dimensional, rather than complete, separable metric spaces; and we do not
assume equicontinuous payoﬀs. As a special case, however, the private components
uj may be payoﬀ-irrelevant and uniformly and independently distributed over [0,1],
so they serve only as randomization devices; then any pure strategy equilibrium of
our model (in which player j conditions her action on uj) corresponds to a mixed
strategy equilibrium in the game with no private components. This improves Mil-
grom and Weber (1985) by dropping equicontinuity but assuming ﬁnite-dimensional
actions; this result, however, specializes Section 3.4 of Balder (2002).5
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Proposition 2, which
consists of mapping the product Bayesian game model into the abstract framework,
verifying (A1)–A(10), and applying Corollary 1. We ﬁrst deﬁne ˜ U =  
n
j=1Uj as the
disjoint union of Uj, j = 1,...,n, and for notational simplicity, we henceforth treat
the Uj as disjoint subsets of ˜ U. We metrize ˜ U so that elements of Uj and Uk, j ≠ k,
are at distance one, and we let ˜ U be the corresponding Borel sigma-algebra, which
is just ﬁnite unions of Borel sets in Uj, j = 1,...,n. Deﬁning N = T × ˜ U, (A1) is
satisﬁed. To fulﬁll (A2), we convert the transition probability νj∶Tj × Uj → [0,1]
to ˜ νj∶Tj × ˜ U → [0,1] in the obvious way: given any S ∈ ˜ U, ˜ νj(S tj) = νj(S ∩ Uj tj).
Thus, when integrating with respect to ˜ νj(⋅ tj), realizations uk, k ≠ j, of the private
value component for other players receive no weight. We then deﬁne ˜   = (˜  j)n
j=1 so
that ˜  j is the extension of ˜ νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗κj to N.
We convert feasible action correspondences Aj∶Tj × Uj ⇉ Rd to ˜ Aj∶Tj × ˜ U ⇉ Rd
by specifying ˜ Aj(tj,u) = Aj(tj,u) if u ∈ Uj, otherwise set ˜ Aj(tj,u) = {e1}, where
e1 is the ﬁrst unit coordinate vector, if u ∉ Uj. Then (B2) and (B3) immediately
imply (A3)–(A5). A choice function is then γ = (γj)n
j=1, where γj∶Tj × U → Rd
satisﬁes γj(tj,u) ∈ ˜ Aj(tj,u) for ˜ νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗ κj-almost all (tj,u). We deﬁne expected
actions as above, now integrating over u ∈ ˜ U with respect to ˜ νj(⋅ tj), e.g., ˜ αj(tj γj) ≡
∫uγj(tj,u)˜ νj(du tj), and the average choice functions for j determined by γj, de-
noted ˜ Aj, are the mappings that equal ˜ αj(⋅ γj) up to a κj-measure zero set. We
imbed ˜ Aj in L1
j with the weak topology, and of course, ˜ A = ⨉
n
j=1 ˜ Aj is endowed with
the product weak topology.
5We allow for action sets to be type-dependent, whereas Balder’s (2002) Theorem 3.4.1 ﬁxes
action sets independently of type; but that extra generality can be achieved using his methods.
Note that his Theorem 3.2.1 generalizes a result of Kim and Yannelis (1997), and his Theorem 3.4.1
generalizes results of Balder (1988) and Balder and Rustichini (1994).EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 23
Given ˜ α ∈ ˜ A, we deﬁne the choice correspondence Mj(⋅; ˜ α)∶Tj × U ⇉ Rd as the
actions maximizing the player’s interim expected payoﬀ conditional on (tj,u). Con-
vert the payoﬀ function πj∶Rnd × T × Uj → R to ˜ πj∶Rnd × T × ˜ U → R by specifying
˜ πj(a,t,u) = πj(a,t,u) if u ∈ Uj, and otherwise set ˜ πj(a,t,u) = 0 if u ∉ Uj. Since T is
a complete, separable metric space, Theorem 5.3.7 of Rao (1993) allows us to choose
a regular conditional probability κ∶Tj×T−j → [0,1], i.e., a transition probability such
that for all tj outside a κj-measure zero set T′
j, κ(⋅ tj) is a conditional probability
on T−j. Note that (B6) implies that for tj outside a κj-measure zero set T′′
j , κ(⋅ tj)











 ˜ πj(a,t,u) κ(t−j tj)κj(dtj)
< ∞,
where we use the generalization of Fubini’s theorem in Proposition 2.3.2 of Rao
(1993). Thus, ∫t−j supa∈∆n  ˜ πj(a,t,u) κ(t−j tj) < ∞ for all tj outside a κj-measure
zero set T′
j ∪T′′′




Our arguments will apply to tj ∈ Tj ∖ ˜ Tj, ﬁxing choice sets arbitrarily for tj ∈ ˜ Tj.
Thus, deﬁne interim expected payoﬀs as ˜ Πj(⋅; ˜ α)∶Rd × Tj × ˜ U → R by
˜ Πj(aj,tj,u; ˜ α) =  
t−j
˜ πj(aj, ˜ α−j(t−j),t,u)κ(t−j tj),
and deﬁne the corresponding choice correspondence Mj(⋅; ˜ α)∶Tj × ˜ U ⇉ Rd as
Mj(tj,u; ˜ α) = argmax{˜ Πj(aj,tj,u; ˜ α) ∶ aj ∈ ˜ Aj(tj,u)}
when tj ∈ Tj ∖ ˜ Tj, and otherwise deﬁne Mj(tj,u; ˜ α) to consist of the ﬁrst unit co-
ordinate vector when tj ∈ ˜ Tj. Then (A6) and (A9) are trivially satisﬁed, and (B4)
immediately implies (A7).
Before establishing (A8), we claim that ˜ Πj(⋅; ˜ α) is Borel measurable. Indeed, de-
ﬁne ˜ κ(⋅ tj,u) by extending κ(⋅ tj) to T ⊗ ˜ U with unit mass on (tj,u), i.e., given Q =
R×S = (⨉
n
j=1Rj)×S ∈ T ⊗ ˜ U, we specify ˜ κ(Q tj,u) = κ(R−j tj) if (tj,u) ∈ Rj×S, and
otherwise ˜ κ(R×S tj,u) = 0 if (tj,u) ∉ Rj ×S. Then ˜ κ(⋅ ⋅)∶(Tj ×U)×(T ⊗ ˜ U) → [0,1]
is a transition probability. By Theorem 19.12 of AB, the mapping (tj,u) ↦ ˜ κ(⋅ tj,u)
is Borel measurable with the weak* topology on the space of Borel probability
measures on T × U, and Theorem 19.7 of AB implies that for every bounded,
Borel measurable f∶T × U → R, the mapping (tj,u) ↦ ∫(t,u)f(t,u)˜ κ(d(t,u) tj,u) =
∫t−j f(t,u)κ(dt−j tj) is Tj⊗ ˜ U-measurable. By (B5), ˜ πj(aj, ˜ α−j(t−j),t,u) is ˜ νj(⋅ ⋅)⊗κ-
integrable, and therefore it is approximated pointwise by the sequence {fm} of trun-
cations deﬁned by fm(t,u) = min{m,max{−m,˜ πj(aj, ˜ α−j(t−j),t,u)}}. For each m,
the mapping (tj,u) ↦ ∫(t,u)fm(t,u)κ(dt−j tj) is Tj⊗ ˜ U-measurable, and therefore, so24 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
is the pointwise limit (see Theorem 4.27 of AB), which is ˜ Πj(aj,⋅; ˜ α) by Lebesgue’s
dominated convergence theorem. This argument holds when aj is any unit coordi-
nate vector, eℓ, ℓ = 1,...,d, and in general (B4) yields






where aj = (pℓ)d
ℓ=1. As the composition of a linear function with a ﬁnite number
of measurable functions, ˜ Πj(aj,tj,u; ˜ α) is Borel measurable, as claimed. Clearly,
the interim expected payoﬀ of player j is in fact continuous in aj, so ˜ Πj(⋅; ˜ α) is
a Carath´ eodory function. Finally, we can now apply a measurable version of the
maximum theorem (see Theorem 18.19 of AB) to conclude that Mj(⋅; ˜ α) is lower
measurable, fulﬁlling (A8).
The last assumption to verify is (A10). Fix (tj,u) ∈ Tj× ˜ U. Obviously, Mj(tj,u;⋅)
is sequentially upper hemicontinuous when tj ∈ ˜ Tj. So suppose tj ∈ Tj ∖ ˜ Tj. Let-
ting Z = {1,...,d} and zj ∈ Z, we claim that for each unit coordinate vector ezj,
˜ Πj(ezj,tj,u; ˜ α) is continuous in ˜ α. Indeed, consider any net {˜ αν} converging weakly
to ˜ α in ˜ A. We apply results of Balder (1988) for transition probabilities by viewing
the unit simplex in Rd, ∆, as the set of probability distributions over Z and viewing
expected actions ˜ βk∶Tk × 2Z → [0,1], k = 1,...,n, as transition probabilities. Let
Rk ∈ Tk and (continuous) g∶Z → R be given. Using the equivalent vector repre-
sentations g = (gℓ)d
ℓ=1 ∈ Rd, ˜ αν
k(tk) = (˜ αν
k(tk)ℓ)d









k(tk,dzk)κk(dtk) =  
tk∈Rk










By part (c) of Balder’s (2002) Theorem 2.2, because Rk and g were arbitrary, it
follows that convergence of expected actions {˜ αν
k} to ˜ αk in the weak topology on
˜ Ak implies convergence in the narrow topology (also called the “weak topology”) on
transition probabilities.
Given any expected actions (˜ βk)k≠j for players other than j, we can deﬁne the
product transition  k≠j ˜ βk∶T × 2Zn
→ [0,1] as follows: for all t ∈ T and all Y =
⨉k≠j Yk ⊆ Zn, ( k≠j ˜ βk)(t,Y ) = ∏k≠j ˜ βk(tk,Yk). Balder’s (1988) Theorem 2.5 im-
plies that the product mapping (˜ βk)k≠j ↦  k≠j ˜ βk is continuous in the narrow topol-
ogy, where the range is the set of transition probabilities from T−j, endowed with the
product measure  k≠j κk, into the probability distributions on Zn. Returning to the
continuity argument, the net { k≠j ˜ αν
k} of product transitions therefore converges
in the narrow sense to  k≠j ˜ αk. Using (B6) and the assumption that tj ∉ ˜ Tj, κ(⋅ tj)EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 25
has density h(⋅ tj)∶T−j → R with respect to  k≠j κk, so we have
˜ Πj(ezj,tj,u; ˜ αν) =  
t−j




We represent a proﬁle of pure strategies for players other than j by an (n−1)-tuple
z−j = (zk)k≠j ∈ Zn−1, and we write φj(z−j,t,u) = ˜ πj(ezj,(ezk)k≠j,t,u) for the vector
of player j’s payoﬀ when, given (t,u), j chooses zj and the other players choose z−j.
By multilinearity, from (B4), and Fubini’s theorem, we then have










Note that the integrand φj(z−j,t,u)h(t−j tj) above is (trivially) continuous in z−j
and jointly measurable in (t−j,z−j). Furthermore, we have  φj(z−j,t,u)h(t−j tj)  ≤





 ˜ πj(a,t,u)h(t−j tj)  
k≠j




 ˜ πj(a,t,u) κ(dt−j tj)
< ∞.
Therefore, it is a Carath´ eodory integrand (Balder (1988)), and by deﬁnition of the
narrow topology, we have











establishing continuity of ˜ Πj(ezj,tj,u; ˜ α) in ˜ α, as claimed. For joint continuity, recall
that in general,




where aj = (pℓ)d
ℓ=1, which is continuous in (aj, ˜ α).
To ﬁnish the argument for (A10), consider any sequence {˜ αm} converging weakly
to ˜ α in ˜ A, and any sequence {am
j } converging to aj in ˜ Aj(tj,u). Since Mj(tj,u;⋅)
has compact range, by (B2), it suﬃces to show that aj ∈ Mj(tj,u; ˜ α). Since
˜ Πj(aj,tj,u; ˜ α) is jointly continuous in (aj, ˜ α), this follows immediately from the-
orem of the maximum (AB, Theorem 17.31).
To prove (a), we apply Theorem 1 to select a choice equilibrium γ∗ = (γ∗
j )n
j=1 in
the abstract framework. From γ∗
j ∶Tj × ˜ U → Rd, j = 1,...,n, we deﬁne the strategy
σ∗
j ∶Tj×Uj → Rd in the obvious way by σ∗
j (tj,uj) = γ∗
j (tj,uj) for all (tj,uj) ∈ Tj×Uj,
i.e., σ∗
j is simply the restriction of γ∗
j to Tj × Uj. We claim that the corresponding
strategy proﬁle σ∗ = (σ∗
j )n
j=1 is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. If not, then there is some26 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
player j with a strategy σj such that Πj(σj,σ∗
−j) > Πj(σ∗). Letting α∗ = α(⋅ σ∗) and
˜ α∗ = ˜ α(⋅ γ∗) be the corresponding expected actions, and letting γj be any extension
of σj to Tj × ˜ U, we have
Πj(σj,α∗
−j) =  
t 
u























˜ πj(γj(tj,u), ˜ α∗
−j(t−j),t,u)h(t−j tj)κ(dt−j tj)(˜ νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗κj)(d(tj,u))
=  
(tj,u)
˜ Πj(γj(tj,u),tj,u; ˜ α
∗)(˜ νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗κj)(d(tj,u)),
with a similar decomposition for Πj(σ∗
j ,α∗
−j). But then there is a set of Q ∈ Tj ⊗ ˜ U
with positive ˜ νj(⋅ ⋅) ⊗κj-measure such that for all (tj,u) ∈ Q, we have tj ∉ ˜ Tj and
˜ Πj(γj(tj,u),tj,u; ˜ α
∗) > ˜ Πj(γ
∗
j (tj,u),tj,u; ˜ α
∗).
Thus, for all (tj,u) ∈ Q, we have γ∗
j (tj,u) ∉ Mj(tj,u; ˜ α∗), contradicting the fact that
γ∗ is a choice equilibrium. This establishes (a).
For (b), assume that {νj(⋅ tj) ∶ tj ∈ Tj} are nonatomic, which implies {˜ νj(⋅ tj) ∶ tj ∈
Tj} are as well. Let σ∗ be any Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and deﬁne the choice function
γ∗ = (γ∗
j )n
j=1 by extending σ∗
j to Tj × ˜ U, j = 1,...,n, arbitrarily. By arguments
similar to the above, γ∗ is a choice equilibrium. Then Corollary 1 yields an extremal
choice equilibrium ˆ γ that is equivalent to γ∗. Finally, deﬁning the strategy proﬁle
ˆ σ = (ˆ σj)n
j=1 by restricting each ˆ γj to T × Uj, the resulting strategy proﬁle is a pure
strategy Bayes-Nash that is equivalent to σ∗, as required.
Appendix A. Lower Measurability of Extreme Points
This appendix contains a lemma establishing, among other things, lower measur-
ability of the closure of extreme points of a correspondence. Note that by Lemma
18.3 of AB, this result extends to the correspondence extϕ(⋅) of extreme points as
well (although this correspondence may not have closed values).
Lemma 10: Let (S,Σ) denote a measurable space, and assume ϕ∶S ⇉ Rd is
lower measurable with nonempty and compact values. Then the correspondence s ↦
extϕ(s) is lower measurable with nonempty and compact values.EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA 27
Proof: Nonempty and compact values follow from compactness of ϕ(s). To
prove lower measurability, let ψ(s) = coϕ(s), and note that these sets possess the
same extreme points, i.e., extψ(s) = extϕ(s). Thus, it suﬃces to show that the
correspondence s ↦ extψ(s) is lower measurable. Let {xm} be a countable, dense
subset of Rd, and for each m, deﬁne the continuous mapping dm∶Rd → R by dm(x) =
  xm −x  . By a measurable version of the maximum theorem (see Theorem 18.19 of
AB), the correspondence Φm∶S ⇉ Rd deﬁned by
Φm(s) = argmax{dm(x) ∶ x ∈ ψ(s)}
is lower measurable. By Corollary 7.87 of AB, Φm(s) is contained among the ex-
posed points of ψ(s), and therefore Φm(s) ⊆ extψ(s).6 By Lemma 18.4 of AB, it




Given any s ∈ S, we claim that Φ(s) is dense among the exposed points of ψ(s).
Let y be any exposed point of ψ(s), and let f∶Rd → R be a linear function such
that argmax{f(x) ∶ x ∈ ψ(s)} = {y}, i.e., letting p be the gradient of f normalized
so that   p   = 1, we have p ⋅ x < p ⋅ y for all x ∈ ψ(s) with x ≠ y. Consider any
ǫ > 0, and deﬁne zn = y − np. We will prove that for n > 0 large enough, we have
argmax{  zn−x   ∶ x ∈ ψ(s)} ⊆ Bǫ(y). If not, then for arbitrarily large n, there exists
vn ∈ ψ(s) ∖ Bǫ(y) such that   zn − vn   ≥   zn − y   = n. By compactness of ψ(s), we
may assume vn → v ∈ ψ(s). Since y uniquely maximizes f on ψ(s) and y ≠ v, there
exists a > 0 such that p ⋅v + a < p ⋅y. Setting w = y − ap, we have p ⋅v = p ⋅w, and in
particular, the vectors v −w and w − zn are orthogonal. It follows that
  zn − v   =
 
  zn − w  2 +  v − w  2 =
 
(n −a)2 +   v − w  2,
which is strictly less than n for n great enough. This implies v ∈ Bn(zn) for high
enough n. Furthermore, the sequence {Bn(zn)} is increasing in the sense of set
inclusion, for given any x ∈ Bn(zn), we have   zn+1−x   ≤   zn+1−zn  +  zn−x   ≤ n+1,
implying Bn(zn) ⊆ Bn+1(zn+1). We conclude that   zn − vn   < n for high enough n,
a contradiction. Thus, argmax{d  zn − x   ∶ x ∈ ψ(s)} ⊆ Bǫ(y) for some n. Since
{xm} is dense in Rd, we may approximate zn to an arbitrary degree by elements
xm, and then the theorem of the maximum (Theorem 17.31 of AB) implies that
Φm(s) ⊆ Bǫ(y) for some m, and therefore Φ(s)∩Bǫ(s) ≠ ∅. We conclude that Φ(s)
is dense among the exposed points of ψ(s), as claimed.
Finally, Theorem 7.89 of AB implies that the exposed points of ψ(s) are dense
among the extreme points of ψ(s), and therefore Φ(s) = extψ(s) for all s ∈ S. Then
6Given a set A ⊆ R
d, we say x ∈ R
d is a strongly exposed point of A if it is the unique maximizer
over A of a linear function.28 BARELLI AND DUGGAN
lower hemicontinuity of s ↦ extψ(s) follows from Lemma 18.3 of AB. This completes
the proof of the lemma.
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